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Abstract- Various public key encryption systems have been
proposed in modern information techology. Some of them have
also been used in various applications, such as E-commerce
and mobile database. This paper proposes two secure receiptor-
oriented encryption systems. The decryptioner's private keys
could be changed with the different time periods. This case
would be very useful in some practical scenarios, for instance,
in a mobile database environment. Besides the semantic security,
the proposed schemes have the backward-and-future security,
a new security requirement for semantically secure encryption
schemes. In terms of construction, the two schemes are based
on the pairings over elliptic curves. Also, this paper provides a
heuristic security analysis for the underlying system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various public key encryption systems have been proposed
in modern information techology. Some of them have also
been used in various applications, such as E-commerce and
mobile database. Semantic security is one of the security
requirements for a secure cryptosystem. Generally speaking,
semantic security means that: the view of the ciphertext gives
no additional information about the plaintext. Galindo et al
proposed these two schemes [1], [2] in 2003, which are based
on elliptic curves. Both of them present semantic security. And
they only use the single coordinate of any point over elliptic
curves. In contrast to the two schemes, our new schemes use
the whole point on the elliptic curves and bilinear pairings to
take part in calculations. In addition, our semantically secure
encryption scheme is a new type of cryptosystems, since it
provides a new security requirement, i.e. backward-and-future
security.
Bilinear pairings modified from Weil or Tate pairings [3] are
becoming one of new active research topics in information
security. Especially, the supersingular curves are the main
object used by the bilinear pairings. However, prior to [2], [4],
[9], the supersingular curves were undesirable in cryptographic
settings since Weil pairing can reduce the discrete logarithm
problems in supersingular curves to that in an extension of
the underlying finite field. Thanks to Joux [4] and Boneh et al
[2], the pairings have become desirable and applied to various
cryptographic primitives: public key encryption [2], digital
signature [5], key agreement [4]; and signcryptions [6]. In our
paper, we propose several new public key encryption schemes
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different from [2]. And the new constructions are motivated
by some techniques from [7], [1], [9].
The main contributions of our paper are:
. A new type of semantically secure public key encryption
schemes are proposed in this paper. That is, it combines
the encryptioner's both public key and private keys with
the decryptioner's public keys in encryption algorithms.
. The backward-and-future security is introduced into the
semantic secure cyrptosytems. Since in some cases, one
part of private keys may be compromised by some at-
tackers, so backward-and-future security will solve these
circumstances.
. Various semantically secure encryption schemes are pro-
posed over elliptic curves, which are based on Pairings.
And this will provide more choices in public key cryp-
tosystems.
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces the definition of receiptor-oriented encryption
scheme and the corresponding requirements on the receiptor-
oriented encryption schemes. Section 3 presents some pre-
liminaries for the new proposed schemes. The constructions
on the new cryptosystems are presented in section 4. The
security analysis and the efficiency analysis stay in section
5 and section 6, respectively. And section 7 concludes this
paper.
II. DEFINITIONS OF RECEIPTOR-ORIENTED ENCRYPTIONS
In this section, the model of the receiptor-oriented encryp-
tion scheme is presented as follows.
Definition 1 (Receiptor-Oriented Encryptions) A
receiptor-oriented encryption (abbr. ROE) scheme is a
public key cryptosystem comprised of the following three
procedures, and in which two entities (encryptioner and
decryptioner) are involved:
(1) Key Generation: On input a security parameter X,
this probabilistic algorithm returns the long-term public keys
and private keys for the encriptioner (pk2, sk2) and the
decriptioner (pkl, skl), respectively. Simultaneously, this
algorithm also outputs a pair of specified time-stage(ti) public
key pkti and private key skt, for the oriented receiptor, i.e.
the decryptioner. The initialized time-stage is to. Therefore,
the initial time-stage public key and private key for the
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decryptioner are pkt, and skt., respectively.
(2) Encryption: This is a probabilistic algorithm carried by
the encryptioner. Given a plaintext m, the encryptioner will
encrypt m by use of its own long-term public key pk2 and
private key sk2. During the encrypting, the encryptioner will
also use the oriented receiptor's (i.e. decryptioner's) specified
time-stage public key pkt, and long-term public key pkl. In
addition, some random elements chosen by the encryptioner
will be involved. In the end, the encryptioner publishes the
ciphertext C (of plaintext m) on its homepage. Furthermore,
its homepage will be renewed in time.
(4) Decryption: This is an algorithm done by the
decryptioner. The algorithm inputs the ciphertext C, the
decryptioner's long-term public key pk1 and private key skl,
its specified time-stage public key pkt, and private key skt*
as well as the encryptioner's public key pk2. In the end, the
plaintext m will be returned.
Definition 2 (Requirements of a Secure ROE Scheme) A
secure receiptor oriented public key encryption scheme must
satisfy at least the following three requirements.
(1) Soundness: For any plaintext m e M (M is the plaintext
space), and for any given time stage ti, there always holds that:
Dpk1,pk2,sk1,skt.,pkt. (Epk1,pk2,sk2,pkt. (i, r)) = m (1)
where E and D are the encryption and the decryption al-
gorithms respectively; r is a random element chosen by -the
encryptioner; pkh, pkt,, and skl, skti are the decryptioner's
public keys and private keys respectively; pk2 and sk2 are the
encryptioner's public and private keys.
(2) Semantic Security: For any m C M(M is the plaintext
space), for any polynomial time attacker A, who can input
the public keys of the encryptioner and decryptioner, cannot
distinguish the ciphertext c(of plaintext m) from a random
element q$ ER C (C is the ciphertext space) in polynomial
time.
(3) Backward-and-future Security: This property is with
respect to the oriented receiptor while its specified time-stage
private skti is compromised by an attcker A. Backward-and-
future security means that even though attacker A obtains the
time-stage private skt, for the time stage ti, A is still not able
to do the followings:
* figure out the plaintext of any ciphertext c encrypted
during time-stage ti.
. derive the former time-stage ti-1's private key skt_1
from skt-
* calculate the latter time-stage ti+1's private key skt,+±
from skt .
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we choose e as the security parameter for all
the proposed receiptor-oriented encryption schemes. Let q be
a large prime, and Zq be Zq\{O}. Fq denotes a finite field
with q elements. e denotes the bit-wise XOR calculation. Let
n be a positive integer with n = 0(f). Let H1 and H2 be
two cryptographic hash functions: H1 : G2 -+ {o, l}ln, and
H2: G1 x G1 -÷ Z*; where H1 is a universal one-way hash
function [8]. G1 and G2 will be given later.
Definition 3 Let p > 3 be a prime. An elliptic curve over
the the finite field Fp, denoted by Ep(a,b) or E(a,b)/Fp,
where a, b E Fp, and gcd(4a3 + 27b2) = 1, is the set of points
P(x,y) such that y2 = (X3 + ax + b)mod p, together with a
point 0, called the point at infinity.
In our paper, we choose elliptic curves E(a, b)/Fp with
y2 (X3 + ax + b)mod p such that:
* a = 0; b is some random integer with gcd(27b2,p) - 1.
For simplicity, b may be equal 1.
p _ 2mod 3. In this case, the order of E(0, b)/Fp(the
number of it) is IE(0, b)/FpI = p + 1, and thus avoiding
the difficulty of computing JE(a, b)/Fpl.
* the bit length of p is t; and f may be equal to or larger
than 160 for security reason.
IV. RECEIPTOR-ORIENTED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
In this section, we will propose two receiptor-oriented
encryption schemes. Both of these schemes are constructed
over elliptic curves described in section 3.1. And we develop
the constructions motivated by some techniques from [9], [1],
[7]. In detail, we will propose two non-identity receiptor-
oriented encryption schemes. That is, we will only use the
elliptic curve settings to construct the ROE schemes. This
kind of ROE schemes does not involve the fully contracted
obsession, i.e. there needs no key generation centre.
A. non-Identity based ROE Scheme I
By the definition of the ROE scheme, the non-identity
based receiptor-oriented encryption scheme 1 has still three
algorithms:
(1) Key Generation This is a polynomially probabilistic
algorithm, which first obtains an elliptic curve E((o, 1)/Fp
constructed as in section 3. All other system parameters are
the same as what are in section 3, including p, q, G1, G2,
e(*, *), and a generator P C G1. At the end of this algorithm,
it returns two pairs of long-term public keys and private keys
respectively for the encryptioner and the decryptioner. The
encryptioner's long-term public key is uP E G1, and private
key is u E Z.. And the decryptioner's long-term public key
is sP E G1, and private key is s E Zq. In addition, the
decryptioner will have a pair of specified time-stage public key
vP E G1 and private key v C Zq according to the definition
of ROE scheme.
(2) Encryption This is a polynomially probabilistic al-
gorithm, which inputs a plaintext m E M and outputs its
corresponding ciphertext.
. the encryptioner chooses uniformly and randomly an
element r C Zq, and computes fA = rP.
* the encryptioner then computes
f2 = e(VP+H2(vP, sP)sP, cl +H2(cl, uP)uP)u+H2(vP,c1 od
and f3 = H1(f2), respectively.
* At the last step, he computes fA = P m.
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Then, he publishes the ciphertext {fi, f4}- and commitment technique [?], [?], and Schnnor authentica-
(3) Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm, apart from tion scheme to manage their own public key and private key,
ciphertexts, which inputs the decryptioner's public key and respectively.
private key, as well as her specified time-stage public and
private key. In addition, the encryptioner's public key will also V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
be inputted. In this section, we will deal with some security analyses
* the decryptioner first calculates on these ROE schemes by the definition of receiptor-oriented
encryption scheme. We will prove that the two non-identity
d= e(ci+H2(ci, uP)uP, uP+H2(vP, ci)ci)v+H2(vP sP)'lmeqschemes both have the soundness, semantic security,
* she calculates d2 = H1 (di).
. she recovers the corresponding plaintext m by m =
d2 D f4- If the ciphertext {fi, f4} is invalid, then she
will output nothing U.
In the above scheme, there are one pairing evaluation and
an modular exponentiation in both encryption and decryption
algorithms.
B. Non-ID-based ROE Scheme 2
The non-identity based ROE scheme 2 has the following
three algorithms: Key generation, Encryption, and Decryption
algorithms.
(1) Key Generation This is a polynomiallly probabilistic
algorithm, which returns the domain parameters: a security
parameter e ; two groups G1 and G2 with the same order q, and
the former is an additive group, and the latter is a multiplicative
group; a bilinear pairing e(*, *) : G1 x G1 -* G2; a generator
P E G1, and therefore e(P, P) e G2 is a generator of G2; a
universal collision-free one-way hash function H () : G2
{0, 1}1n, where n = Q(F). At the end of this algorithm, the
encryptioner obtains his long-term public key 3P e G1 and
private key ,3 E Z.*; Besides obtaining her long-term public
key aP E G1 and private key a E Z,* the decryptioner also
obtains a pair of specified time-stage public key pP e G1 and
private key p E Zq, respectively.
(2) Encryption This algorithm is dealt with by the en-
cryptioner in probabilistic polynomial time. For any plaintext
m e M = f0, i}n, the following procedures will be done:
* the encryptioner first chooses uniformly and randomly an
elelment r E Zq, and calculates fi = rP E G1.
* he then calculates by use of pairing e(*, *) f2 =
e(aP,fi)le(,3P, pP)r, and as well f3 = H1(f2).
* In the end, he returns the corresponding ciphertext
(f1,f4) by f4=mef3.
(3) Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm carried
out by the decryptioner (i.e. the oriented receiptor). Given a
ciphtext (fi, f4), she will do.
* the decryptioner first calculates an elelment d, =
e(fi,/3P)ae(13P,fi)P E G2, and d2 = Hi(dj) E
{o, 1In.
* she recovers the corresponding plaintext m by m = d2 ED-
f4-
Remark: In the above two non-identity based receiptor-
oriented encryption schemes, the encryptioner and the decryp-
toiner may make use of some key distribution technique [9],
and backward-and-future security.
A. Soundness
The soundness of the receiptor-oriented encryption schemes
is that: if the encryptioner correctly calculates the ciphertexts
according to the descriptions of encryption algorithm, and if
the decryptioner correctly carries on the decryption algorithm,
then the latter will surely recover the corresponding plaintexts.
Theorem 1 The two non-identity based receiptor-oriented
encryption schemes in section 4 both have the soundness. In
other words, if {ff, f4} is a legal ciphertext returned by the
encryptioner on plaintext m C {0, 1}n, then the decryptioner
will surely recover the plaintext m E {0, 1}n such that
Dup,u,sp,vp,p(Eup,sp,s,sp,p(m, r)) = m (2)
where E and D are the encryption and the decryption al-
gorithms respectively; r is a random element chosen by the
encryptioner; and other data are the same to what in the two
non-identity based ROE schemes in section 4.
Proof. Because of the similar proofs on the two ROE schemes,
we only present the theorem proof for the non-identity based
ROE scheme 1.
By the encryption algorithm of the identity-based ROE
scheme 1, we can write
fi = rP;




where r E Zq is a random element.
Since d, = e(c, + H2(fi,uP)uP,uP +
H2(vP, fi)fi)v+H2(vpsp)smod q, and by the key generation
algorithm, therefore
di = e(fi + H2(fi,uP)uP,uP)v+H2(vPsP)s x e(fi +
H2 (fl, uP)uP, H2 (vP, fi )fl )V+H2(vP,sP)smod q
= e(fi + H2(fi,uP)uP,uP)v x e(fi +
H2(f1, UP)uP, Up)H2(vP,SP)S x e(fi +
H2(fl, uP)uP, H2(vP, fi)fi)v+H2(vPSP)Smod q
= e(fi +H2(fl, uP)uP, vP+H2(vP, Sp)Sp)u+H2(vPfl)r X
e(fi + H2(fi, uP)uP, H2(vP, fi)fi)v+H2(vPosP)smod q
= e(fi +H2(fl, uP)uP, vP+H2(vP, SP)SP)u+H2(vPfl)r X
e(fi + H2(fi,uP)uP,H2(vP,fi)fi)v x e(fi +
H2(f1, uP)uP, H2(vP, fl)fi) H2(vPsP)smod q
= e(fl +H2(fl, uP)uP, vP+H2(vP, Sp)Sp)u+H2(vPfl)r X
e(fi + H2(fi,uP)uP,vP)rH2(vPJfI) x e(fi +
H2(fi, uP)uP, H2(vP, sP)sP)rH2(vPfl)mod q
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= e(fi + H2(f1, uP)uP, vP + H2(vP, sP)sP)u x e(vP +
H2(VP, sP)sP, fi + H2(fi,up)Up)rH2(vpfl)mod q
= e(vP + H2(vP, sP)sP, fi +
H2(fi, uP)uP)u+H2(vPJf)rmod q
= f2 mod q.
Hence,
d2= Hi(di) f3-
Thus, the recovered plaintext is
d2 ED ®f4D = m-
Therefore, the soundness is satisfied in this scheme.
B. Semantic Security
The semantic security of the receiptor-oriented encryption
schemes is that: if for any plaintext mo E {0, 1} (the plaintext
space), for any polynomial time attacker A, who can input
the public keys of the encryptioner and decryptioner, cannot
distinguish the ciphertext c (of plaintext mo) from a random
element 0 ER C (C is the ciphertext space) in polynomial
time.
Theorem 2 The two non-identity based receiptor-oriented
encryption schemes in section 4 both have the semantic
security. That is to say, if {fi,f4} is any legal ciphertext
returned by the encryptioner on plaintext m C {O, 1}1, then
any probabilistic polynomial time attacker A will distinguish
between {fi, f4 and {X, Y} with negligible probability;
where X and Y are two random elements belonging to G,
and G2, respectively.
Proof. Notice that, By the descriptions on encryption al-
gorithms of the identity-based receiptor-oriented encryption
scheme 1 in section 4, and without loss of generality, we may
let
fi = (P
f2 = e((Q1,PKGC)e(S2, pkt) (mod q)
f3= IHI (fh)
f = f3 EDm.
where ( E Zq is an unknown (with respect to A) random
element; pkt, and Qi are the decryptioner's specified time-
stage public key and long-term public key, respectively. m
is any plaintext in {0, 1}'. PKGC is the domain public
parameter.
Since ( is a random element in Zq, fi = (P is a random
element in GI. In addition, c2 is also random in G2 since
e(*, *) is a bilinear map from G1 x G1 to G2. Therefore, by
the definition of universal collision-free one-way hash function
[8], we know that f4 = f3 E m is a random element in
G2. What's more, the attacker A does not know the value
of C C Zq and S2 E G1. Hence, from the point of view of the
attacker A, {fi, f4l is a random pair in G1 x G2. Therefore,
the probability of attacker A tells {f,, f4} from {X, Y} is
approximately l/q2.
According to the above analysis, any probabilistic polyno-
mial time attacker A will distinguish between {f,, f4} and
{X, Y} only with negligible probability.
C. Backward-and-future Security
The backward-and-future security is formalized with respect
to the oriented receiptor while its specified time-stage private
skti is compromised by a probabilistic polynomial time attcker
A. Backward-and-future security means that even though
attacker A obtains the time-stage private skt, for the time
stage ti, A is still not able to: (1) figure out the corresponding
plaintext of any ciphertext c encrypted during time-stage ti;
(2) derive the former time-stage ti- 's private key skt*_,
from skt,; (3) calculate the latter time-stage ti+1's private key
skt2±l based on skt,.
Theorem 3 The two non-identity based receiptor-oriented
encryption schemes in section 4 both have the backward-and-
future security defined in section 2.
Proof. Due to the similar construction of the two non-identity
based ROE schemes, the authors will prove this theorem with
non-identity based ROE scheme 1.
Without loss of generality, we may assume there is
a probabilistic polynomial time attacker A, who already
(because of some special reason) compromised the time-stage
private key skt, of the decryptioner during the course of
ti. In addition, suppose {1fiJ4} is any legal ciphertext on
an arbitrary plaintext m enciphered by the encryptioner. To
complete the proof, we may by the encryption algorithm
assume
fi = Tp
f2 = e(vP + H2(vP,sP)sPjf1 +
H2(fl, uP)uP)u±+7H2(vPJf0) (mod q);
A3 = HI(h);
h = f3 e m.
where 7 is a random element; and the compromised private
key by attacker A is skt, = v.
Now we will prove the probabilistic polynomial time at-
tacker A will not be able to:
(1) figure out the corresponding plaintext m of {fi i f4};
(2) derive the former time-stage private key skt,_1 (of the
decrytioner) from skt, = vP;
(3) calculate the latter time-stage private key skt, l (of the
decryptioner) based on skt, = vP.
Notice that 77, s, and u are all hidden i.e. unknown by the
attacker A from the information theoretical view. Therefore,
(1) By the assumption of ECDL, A is not able to inverse i7
from f =71P. At the same time,
f2 = e(vP+H2(vP, sP)sP, f +±H2(fl,UP)Up)u+fH2(VPf1)
- e(uP + H2(vP, fi)fl, fi + H2(f1, uP)uP)V+SH2(VP'8P)
= e(uP+H2(vP, fi)fi, vP+H2(vP, sp)Sp)n++uH2(f1,UP)(mod q).
By the BDH assumption and IWP assumption, A is not able
to compute d2 , as well as d3. Therefore, she is not able to
figure out the plaintext m -d3= d2 e f4.
(2) By the construction of the non-identity based ROE
scheme 1, both the decryptioner's time-stage private key
skt, and skt,_1 are randomly and uniformly chosen by the
decrypitoner from Zq. Therefore, from the point of view of
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attacker A, skt, and skt,-, have no relationship useful to
attacker A. Thus, she will be not able to derive the former
time-stage private key skti-1 from skti.
(3) Due to the similar reason as above (2), attacker A is not
able to calculate the latter time-stage private key skt,± (of
the decryptioner) based on skt. = vP.
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We first investigate the expansion factor of our new
schemes. Recall what is the expansion factor of encryption
schemes, it is the ratio between the lengths of the cipher text
and the plaintext. The expansion factor of the proposed new
schemes is the same as that of [2]. By this definition, we can
use some compression technique applying to the cipher text
{f,, f4} (of message m) to get its length equal to f4 [81.
Therefore, the expansion factor of all our new schemes is 1,
and at most 2.
In terms of encryption algorithms, the dominated compu-
tation is the bilinear pairing evaluation. The encryption for
non-identity based ROE scheme 2 need two bilinear pairing
evaluations, and one of them can be precomputed. While non-
identity based ROE scheme 1 only need one pairing evaluation.
Because of the symmetric construction of the encryption and
decryption algorithms, so they have the same computation
workloads.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed two non-identity based receiptor-
oriented encryption schemes respectively. In contrast to pre-
vious encryption schemes with semantic security, the new
schemes make use of both the public and private key of encry-
tioner and the public keys of decryptioner. This case may be
very useful in some practical scenarios. Besides the semantics
security the proposed schemes have the backward-and-future
security, a new security requirement for semantically secure
encryption schemes. As a research topic, it is interesting to
analyze the security against chosen cipher-text attack on the
proposed schemes.
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